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Social Control in Online Communities of Consumption:   
A Framework for Community Management 
 
Abstract 
 
Online communities of consumption (OCC) represent highly diverse groups of consumers 
whose interests are not always aligned. Social control in OCCs aims to effectively manage 
problems arising from this heterogeneity. Extant literature on social control in OCCs is 
fragmented as some studies focus on the principles of social control, while other focus on the 
implementation. Moreover, the domain is under-theorized. This paper integrates the disparate 
literature on social control in OCCs providing a first unified conceptualization of the topic. 
The authors conceptualize social control as a system, or configuration, of moderation 
practices. Moderation practices are executed during interactions operating under different 
governance structures (market, hierarchy, and clan) and serving different purposes 
(interaction initiation, maintenance, and termination). From this conceptualization, important 
areas of future research emerge and research questions are developed. The framework also 
serves as a community management tool for OCC managers, enabling the diagnosis of social 
control problems and the elaboration of strategies and tactics to address them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Online communities of consumption (OCC) represent highly diverse groups of consumers, 
since time and geography restrictions are less prevalent (De Valck, Van Bruggen, & 
Wierenga, 2009). Therefore, OCC members have varying community engagement motives 
and different perceptions of appropriate behavior which may result in tensions that damage 
community health (Chalmers Thomas, Price, & Schau, 2013). This paper addresses this 
phenomenon through the lens of social control problems, where the interests of individual 
members are misaligned, damaging the interests of the group. Social control refers to the 
mechanisms or processes that adjust individuals’ behaviors to adhere to certain rules in a 
social group. Social control preempts social problems via socialization and resolves them via 
regulation. Without arrangements to facilitate socialization to a shared community goal and 
spirit, and without regulations that help correct deviant behavior, “members will fail to return 
to the community [and] the community itself will implode” (Celestre, Holmes, & Otte, 2013, 
p. 3). Thus, OCC social control sustains members’ continued engagement and assures the 
group’s viability by tackling social problems (Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007).  
Understanding how social control in OCCs functions is especially important for social 
media managers and community marketers. Managers would benefit from understanding 
which control mechanisms best solve which type of social problems. Explicating when 
managers should intervene or leave the resolution of a problem up to the community members 
themselves would also be beneficial. Specifically, what characterizes their formal 
intervention, and how can managers empower members to solve social problems informally? 
Effective social control systems are vital since the substantial financial investments in people 
and technological platforms assigned to social media marketers result in pressures to provide 
positive return on investment (Reiss-Davis, Parks, Holmes, Celestre, & Otte, 2013).  
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Academics have investigated OCC social control in a variety of contexts, including 
brand communities (e.g., Muniz & Schau, 2005), activity-focused communities (e.g. De 
Valck, 2007), virtual worlds (e.g., Duval Smith, 1999; Fairfield, 2008), innovation 
communities (e.g. Moon & Sproull, 2008), open source communities (O’Mahony  & Ferraro, 
2007; Shah, 2006), problem-solving communities (Wiertz, Mathwick, De Ruyter, & Dellaert, 
2010), communities of learning (e.g., Vlachopoulos & Cowan, 2010) and Wikipedia (Forte, 
Larco, & Bruckman, 2009). This research spans many fields including marketing, information 
systems, management, sociology, cultural studies, law, education and semiotics. Extant 
academic research on social control in OCCs focuses primarily on the principles of social 
control, i.e. the fundamental laws that direct or govern interactions. Different principles have 
been identified from case studies, such as authority (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007), self-control 
(Forte et al., 2009), contract (Fairfield, 2008), coercion (Reid, 1999), merit (Wiertz et al., 
2010), and fairness or reciprocity (Shah, 2006). Currently, no study has taken a holistic 
approach to relating the principles. This is problematic as it hinders theory development and 
the generation of a unified body of knowledge.  
Conversely, practitioner-oriented research has mostly focused on social control 
practices, i.e. the activities aimed at implementing social control during particular 
interactions. Many social control practices have been described, such as enabling new 
member recruitment (Williams, 1999) and integration (Lampe and Resnick, 2004), critical 
member mass development (Colayco & Davis, 2003), behavioral rewards and sanctions 
(Dellarocas 2010), and conflict resolution practices (Duval Smith, 1999). However, these 
practices have generally been presented within “to do” lists that lack theoretical framing, 
limiting integrated understanding.  
Consequently understanding of social control in OCCs is fragmented with some 
studies focusing on the principles of social control and others on social control practices. This 
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paper therefore has two objectives. It first seeks to integrate the literature and delineate social 
control in OCCs, the different constructs it encompasses and their interrelationships (cf., 
MacInnis, 2011). An effective way to delineate constructs and their relationships from a 
fragmented literature is to leverage a well-established theory (Yadav, 2010). Here, 
governance theory is leveraged. Governance theory broadly explains the way organizations 
“govern, organize, and coordinate the actions of individuals to achieve collective outcomes” 
(O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007, p 1079). It offers a range of well-articulated descriptive 
concepts in relation to control and, therefore, helps address delineation issues with regards to 
social control in OCCs. Governance theory is invoked to do two things: i.e., organize the 
different principles of social control identified in the literature into combinations that the 
authors term governance structures; and classify the different social control practices into 
types, termed moderation practice types. The main governance structures identified are 
market, hierarchy, and clan. Moderation practices are differentiated based on their purpose: 
interaction initiation, maintenance and termination. Through this framework of governance 
structures and moderation practices, a holistic picture of OCC social control is created. 
Further, the framework allows for the identification of under-researched areas. Thus, the 
second objective of the paper is to provide a “roadmap for future research” (MacInnis, 2001, 
p. 138) that highlights elements of social control and interrelationships between them. 
This paper contributes to OCC social control literature by delineating OCC social 
control and providing clear avenues for future research. For practitioners, the framework 
provides a community management tool enabling the diagnosis of social control problems and 
the elaboration of strategies and tactics to address them. The remainder of this article is 
organized as follows. First, the authors review the OCC literature to develop a 
conceptualization of, and future research agenda for, governance structures. Subsequently, the 
authors delineate moderation and propose avenues for future research of the implementation 
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of social control. The article concludes with a discussion of theoretical and practical 
contributions. 
 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES OF CONSUMPTION 
 
When social control in OCCs was first investigated, some believed that all online 
communities follow “bazaar governance”, a principle of control specific to social groupings in 
cyberspace (Demil Lecoq, 2006). While further research has shown that different principles of 
control operate, no study has taken a holistic approach to relate the different principles. To 
integrate the literature, the authors took inspiration from governance theory developed in 
Business-to-Business marketing (e.g. Heide, 1994), organizational theory (e.g., Ouchi, 1979), 
institutional economics (e.g., Williamson, 1975), and law (Ellickson, 1987). In this article, the 
authors adopt the label governance structure to indicate a combination of interrelated social 
control principles. It is important to note that OCCs are not overseen by a single governance 
structure, but that within the same OCC different governance structures co-exist (e.g., Shah, 
2006; Wiertz et al., 2010). The authors conceptualize governance structures operating at the 
level of interactions, not the community as a whole. Following governance theory, control 
principles described in the OCC literature were coded based on their guiding logic, the type of 
interaction they apply to, the social control rule and the rule enforcement mechanism they 
abide to, and their underlying normative requirement to achieve social control. Three types of 
OCC governance structures emerged: market, hierarchy and clan (see Table 1). For an 
overview of the literature reviewed see Appendix 1. 
 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Market Governance  
When social control follows the logic of exchange, it creates market governance (cf. Heide, 
1994; Ouchi, 1989; Williamson, 1975). Market governance controls transactions, i.e., discrete 
economic exchanges (Heide, 1994). Transactions unfold when one member gives another a 
product or service in return for something of economic value. This “something” is money in 
OCCs such as Amazon, eBay, and Groupon. It is other products or services in barter 
communities like Thredup (swapping children’s clothes), Swaptree (music exchange), U-
exchange (service exchange), or Goswap (house swapping). The social control rule that 
governs market structures is exchange rate. The exchange rate defines the value of one item in 
comparison to another. It is a price in financial exchanges (e.g., one Bob Dylan record is 
worth $10) or a non-fiscal exchange rate in barter and social transactions (e.g., one Bob Dylan 
record equals three Ray Charles records). Conditions of exchange rate are freely defined and 
enforced via negotiation between involved parties. Beyond exchange rate and negotiation, 
transactions rely on the norm of direct reciprocity to unfold successfully. The norm of direct 
reciprocity prescribes that a member receiving an item of value must directly reciprocate with 
something of similar value. 
The logic of exchange has received sparse attention in the OCC literature. This is 
understandable as communities traditionally function in opposition to the market logic 
governing economic transactions (Kozinets, De Valck, Wojnicki & Wilner 2010). However, 
the reality is that economic transactions do occur in OCCs and can actually be more frequent 
than envisioned in the OCC literature. In many OCCs, members not only discuss favorite 
topics, but also swap or sell items related to their shared consumption interests. Thus, the 
authors propose that these interactions in OCCs are based on the logic of exchange and should 
follow the guiding principles of market governance for effective social control.  
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 To illustrate the structure of market governance, imagine a fictitious OCC for fans of 
electronic music and clubbing (“Clubby”). Katie, a community member, has announced that 
she is selling her collection of LPs. Andrew, another member, is interested. The interaction is 
governed by the two parties’ knowledge of the LPs’ selling price and understanding that once 
the seller passes the collection to the buyer, the latter must give money in exchange. To 
determine an acceptable exchange rate and the exact amount of money for which the 
collection will be exchanged, Katie and Andrew engage in a process of negotiation.  
 
Further research: Technology mediation makes it easier to engage in exchange using 
alternative currencies. For example, if parties distrust online transactions with normal 
currencies, they can use crypto currencies such as BitCoin. If they attach negative meanings 
to money, they can engage in local exchange trading systems where points are traded for 
items (e.g. Book Swap Australia). The world-wide reach of the Internet makes it easier to 
gather people around alternative exchange projects such as selling for non-profit purposes or 
only buying used goods. As a result, OCCs are a playground for experimentations with 
alternative forms of exchange. They all require exchange rate and reciprocity, but can follow 
a different logic to standard sales. Utilitarianism is tempered by expressiveness (Sherry, 
1990):  exchange is not only a means to an end, but also an end in itself – it serves both 
economic and identity needs. Each form of exchange combines economic and identity 
purposes differently, following its own logic and representing a different market governance 
sub-structure. What are the various market governance sub-structures in OCCs and under 
which conditions do they operate? Answering such questions will help researchers better 
understand the different ways in which market governance in OCC is socially embedded. It 
will also help marketers promote the purchase of their products in market community 
contexts. 
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Hierarchy Governance 
When social control follows the logic of authority it creates hierarchy governance. Hierarchy 
governance controls hierarchical interactions, i.e. power asymmetric interactions (Heide, 
1994; Ouchi, 1979). In OCCs, power asymmetry consists of differential access to 
technological resources providing different “physical” abilities in online space (Reid, 1999). 
The social control rule that governs hierarchical interactions is authoritarian standards, i.e. 
conventions defined unilaterally by the more powerful party determining what constitutes 
good or bad behavior (Heide, 1994; Ouchi, 1979). Authoritarian standards are enforced 
through coercion by the party with more technological power (Duval Smith, 1999; Reid, 
1999). Authoritarian standards and their coercive enforcement rely on a norm of legitimate 
authority which prescribes attributes entitling members to greater technological powers. When 
legitimacy comes from members’ “natural” access to technological resources (e.g. when they 
belong to the community’s founding team), it is despotic. High power members are then 
referred to as “autocratic leaders” (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007, p. 1088), “gods” (Reid, 1999, 
p. 109), “Leviathan” (Kollock & Smith, 1996, p. 126) or “dictators” (De Zwart & Lindsey, 
2009, p 5), and rule with absolute authority. When legitimacy comes from members’ talent 
and achievements, it is meritocratic. Privileged access to the community’s technological 
resources is then granted with conditions and restrictions (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Reid, 
1999). The norm of legitimate authority evolves. Duval Smith (1999), for example, describes 
how the creators of an educational game ruled without constraints until the creation of an 
elaborate democratic election system was set up that enabled elected leaders to gain governing 
power and replace the game creators. 
  To illustrate hierarchy governance, imagine an interaction between Clubby member 
Andrew and Fiona, a community administrator. What Andrew is allowed to say or do in the 
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community is unilaterally determined and enforced by Fiona. Fiona has observed that Andrew 
regularly expresses racist comments which are not tolerated. She reminds him of this rule in a 
private email exchange. When she observes that Andrew continues, she may temporarily log 
Andrew out of the community, prevent him from posting, or ban him for good. 
 
Further Research. The extant literature highlights that both sub-types of legitimate hierarchy, 
despotism and meritocracy, co-exist in OCCs. For example, Humphreys (2008) describes how 
Blizzard’s displays of power in World of Warcraft sway between despotic methods of 
punishment and case-by-case meritocratic evaluations of members’ activities. Reid (1999) 
describes how technical powers in an old fashioned virtual world (MUD) are awarded for 
recognized talent (e.g., accomplishment of tasks, ability to create communal bonds), but 
punishment of the powerless is at the whim of the powerful. However, these descriptions lack 
a systematic analysis of the circumstances in which one of the forms of legitimate hierarchy 
takes precedence. To further our understanding of OCC governance structures and expand the 
governance typology to include sub-types differentiated by social rules, enforcement 
mechanisms and normative requirements, more research is needed. In particular, the authors 
call for research that systematically compares and contrasts despotic and meritocratic norms 
in the context of OCCs that are corporate or third-party owned. Here, tensions about 
governance issues between the community administrators and regular members are not 
uncommon. A better understanding of how the two types of social control can co-exist or 
alternate will help build effective social control systems based on hierarchy governance 
structures.  
 
Clan Governance 
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When social control follows the logic of sharing, it creates clan governance. This has been 
called a “democratic mode of governance” (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007, p. 1082), “self-
governance” (Forte et al., 2009, p. 49), “normative governance” (Wiertz et al., 2010, p. 672), 
and “player-to-player control” (Humphreys, 2008, p. 161). The traditional label of clan 
governance (Ouchi, 1979) is used here. Clan governance controls communal interactions, i.e. 
interactions between equal members in a group. The social control rule that governs 
communal interactions is traditions (Ouchi, 1979). Traditions are standards which emerge 
from repetitive behaviors and define group behavior. Respect of traditions is ensured through 
peer pressure. Beyond traditions and peer pressure, control of communal interactions relies on 
collective identity, a lasting, shared sense of belonging to a group. Collective identity can be 
general and pertain to the OCC as a whole, or local, and relate to a sub-group or clique within 
the OCC. For example, in a North American distance running community, all members have a 
sense of belonging to the community based on their shared enthusiasm for the sport. 
However, there are also two sub-identities: the recreational runners who merely seek to stay in 
good shape and the competitive runners who constantly challenge and improve their physical 
performance (Chalmers-Thomas, Price & Schau, 2013).  
To illustrate clan governance, imagine an interaction between Matt, a newcomer to 
Clubby and longtime member Katie. One of the traditions in Clubby is that posts should be 
written in normal, non-abbreviated English using black font and avoiding extreme 
punctuation. When Matt disrespects this tradition, Katie labels him as illiterate and tells him 
this is not the way to write in the community.  
 
Further Research. The shared identity that clan governance’s good functioning requires can 
operate at a global or local level. Many OCCs will combine global and local norms. For 
example, De Valck (2007) describes how, in a culinary community, tensions about 
Social Control in Online Communities of Consumption 
12 
 
appropriate behavior among member subgroups are regularly alleviated by means of rituals 
that celebrate all members’ shared love of food. Here, social control problems are overcome 
by highlighting a common identity. However, at other times, differences between members 
are accentuated when OCC sub-tribes come together to engage in traditions relevant only to 
them, excluding others. Studying runner communities, Chalmers Thomas et al. (2013) 
indicate that tensions regarding the recreational or competitive purposes of running are 
sometimes managed via practices and rituals celebrating members’ shared experiences and 
sometimes by segmenting practices and rituals depending on members’ differing orientations.  
  An interesting avenue for further research is to compare and contrast clan governance 
at the level of local and global identity. Are the types and the functioning of traditions and 
peer pressure the same on these two levels? For example, a problem about etiquette may be 
solved locally with one key member explaining the group’s norms, while a problem about 
community purpose or ethos may require a global consultation of members. Also, community 
members can rely on both local and global identity when attempting to resolve conflicts. What 
kind of local or global traditions have the power to reconcile conflict situations? What is the 
role of particular members during this process? If we assume that peer pressure is an 
important enforcement mechanism, what are the characteristics of the most influential peers?  
 
Hybrid Governance Structures 
Market, hierarchy and clan form a useful starting point for a typology of governance 
structures operating in OCCs. However, they are based on theoretical archetypes developed in 
domains different from OCCs. In the context of OCCs, governance structures sometimes 
merge to form hybrids. These hybrid structures have not been formally conceptualized in 
extant OCC literature. The authors, therefore, introduce two additional governance structures, 
based on combinations of the archetypes. First, market and clan governance are 
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conceptualized to form gift governance. Second, hierarchy and clan governance are 
conceptualized to form reputation governance. Note that the merging of market and hierarchy 
governance has been conceptualized in the B2B literature as franchising, where two 
companies engage in a long-term, unequal commercial relationship (e.g., Kashyap, Antia, & 
Frazier, 2012). This type of hybrid structure is unlikely to occur in OCC and is, therefore, left 
out. In the following sections, the authors conceptualize these hybrids, and indicate avenues 
for further research to advance our theoretical and practical understanding of OCC 
governance structures.  
 
Gift Governance 
First, combining market and clan governance leads to the conceptualization of gift 
governance. Gift governance is defined as a hybrid governance structure following the logic 
of generosity. It controls gift-counter-gift interaction chains via self-enforced communal 
exchange rates and relies on the norm of generalized reciprocity. In appearance, gifting is a 
deliberate, voluntary transfer of resources to another, following the logic of sharing. However, 
gifting also involves an implicit obligation to reciprocate with a counter-gift at a future, 
undefined moment (Belk, 2010), so gifting also follows the logic of exchange. Gift 
governance, thus, follows a hybrid logic which the authors label generosity. Gift-counter-gift 
chains occur during interactions akin to communal interactions (Lampel & Bhalla, 2007), but 
the interactions inevitably involve reciprocal transfers of resources of equivalent value. 
Therefore, they can be conceptualized as transactional relationships that follow the rule of 
exchange rate. Nevertheless, the value of the gift is symbolic rather than economic so an 
appropriate exchange rate is determined by community traditions (Hollenbeck , Peters, & 
Zinkhan, 2006; Giesler, 2006). Gift governance, therefore, controls interactions via communal 
exchange rates. If a counter-gift is considered inadequate, it is difficult for members to openly 
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protest as this alters the original gifting act (Belk, 2010). Peer-pressure and negotiation, thus, 
do not easily merge in gift governance so the enforcement of communal exchange rate is self-
enforced. Finally, gift governance relies on the norm of generalized reciprocity: the receiver 
must reciprocate, but not necessarily to the gifter – she can reciprocate to any community 
member (Kollock, 1999).  
Consider the example of Andrew who regularly receives tips from other Clubby 
members about secret parties in the city. These tips have even led to bookings as Andrew is 
an amateur DJ looking for events to perform at. Thus, Andrew feels indebted to Clubby. Out 
of gratitude, he does his best to answer newcomers’ messages and help them acculturate.  
 
Further Research. Gifting is a common activity in OCCs. Members give each other opinions, 
advice, information and support (Lampel & Bhalla, 2007). It is particularly common in peer-
to-peer problem solving communities (i.e., P3 communities, Wiertz, & De Ruyter, 2007), 
where members offer each other tips and best practice to resolve technical issues. In open 
source communities, members commonly exchange tips to improve software and overcome 
bugs (Shah, 2006). In spite of its ubiquity, gift governance has received limited academic 
attention. Further research should therefore investigate gift governance’s ability to control 
specific social problems.  
One important problem for gift governance is counter-gift free-riding. As the 
conditions of counter-gifting are imprecise (what, to whom, and when?) and nobody can force 
gift-receivers to reciprocate, the problem of free-riding is realistic in OCCs. This problem is 
aggravated since interactions occur via technology-mediation allowing members to stay 
anonymous and to easily disengage from the community. As a result, accountability is low; 
anyone can enter an OCC, receive information and advice, and leave without reciprocating. 
With too many free-riders, OCC contributors may turn their back on the community as their 
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efforts are not reciprocated. This may reduce the community’s knowledge reservoir (De 
Valck, 2007). Further research should investigate the problem of free-riding (e.g., Wiertz et 
al., 2010), especially how the social control rules of communal exchange rate can be better 
defined. For example, would free-riding reduce if clear community rules exist regarding what 
reciprocation is expected, or when community members agree on an acceptable time-frame 
for reciprocation? Similarly, it would be interesting to investigate the rule enforcement 
mechanism in gift governance structures. If one assumes that the ‘pure form’ enforcement 
mechanisms of market and clan governance (i.e., negotiation and peer pressure respectively) 
do not work in gift governance structures, what other mechanisms might replace the 
problematic self-enforcement that commonly rules in OCCs?  
 
Reputation Governance 
The second hybrid governance structure combines hierarchy and clan governance into what 
the authors label reputation governance. Reputation governance follows the logic of 
popularity whereby members strive to become the ‘best’ at something in the community, 
whether it be likability, wittiness, expertise, experience, creativity, number of contributions, 
or something else. Popularity involves authority with OCC members high in popularity 
having more authority and influence than members low in popularity. However, what is 
considered likable, witty, expert, or creative is determined based on shared, communally-
defined norms. Popularity thus fuses the logics of authority and sharing. Reputation governs 
interactions between unequal community members that combine communal and hierarchical 
features. These interactions are controlled by rituals of deference and demeanor (Goffman, 
1967), whereby popular members display their high position in the community’s social 
hierarchy and less popular members express their respect and appreciation. These rituals are 
traditionally developed behavioral standards which more popular members may impose on 
Social Control in Online Communities of Consumption 
16 
 
others. Deference and demeanor rituals therefore fuse traditions and authoritarian standards. If 
a less popular member does not show deference, popular members may turn others against 
her. Such actions represent the coercive exertion of social power via peer pressure and 
combine the enforcement mechanisms of hierarchy and clan. Finally, the social norm 
requirement of reputation governance structures is social hierarchy. This norm lies at the cross 
roads of hierarchy and clan governance as it determines which elements of the shared, 
communal identity become the basis for the hierarchy.  
Let’s revisit Matt, the Clubby newcomer, at the bottom of social hierarchy, and Katie, 
one of the most respected long-term contributors. Katie shows demeanor by opening a 
conversation, passing judgments on what Matt says while using strong language. Matt shows 
deference by contributing to the conversation, asking questions about Katie’s beliefs and 
using kind language. If Matt disrespects Katie, she might make sarcastic jokes to ridicule him 
in front of other members, to turn them against him. 
 
Further Research. Reputation is an important driver of human behavior as prestige provides 
utilitarian and identity benefits. Desire for prestige has been identified as a core motivation to 
contribute to OCCs (Lampel & Bhalla, 2007). A peculiarity of reputation governance in OCC 
lies in technology-mediation enabling the development of reputation systems which makes 
some social hierarchy transparent (cf., Dellarocas, 2003; Dellarocas, 2010). For example, 
reputation systems can make the volume (e.g., number of posts) and quality (e.g., ratings from 
other members) of member contributions visible to the community. Elaborate reputation 
systems on platforms such as eBay, Slashdot and P3 communities have been described in the 
literature (Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003; Moon & Sproull, 2008). These studies have generally 
shown how reputation systems incentivize members to engage in the community.    
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 One social problem regarding reputation systems is the competitive use of the system 
to boost one’s reputation or to defame another. For example, in a culinary community for 
recipe exchange members would contribute nonsense posts to reach the top-ranked 
contributors list (De Valck, 2005). Similarly, members of Amazon and eBay would 
anonymously write critical reviews and give poor ratings to other, competing members 
(Preece, Nonnecke, & Andrews, 2004). These competitions damage mutual trust and 
undermine the natural social hierarchy that protects and perpetuates community culture. Thus, 
a pressing research question considers how reputation systems can be designed to encourage 
meaningful, valuable, and trustworthy member engagement. The literature on community 
culture (e.g., Fournier & Lee, 2009; Schouten & McAlexander, 1995; Muniz & O’Guinn, 
2001; Schau et al., 2009) should provide inspiration to develop a richer understanding of how 
social hierarchical interactions regulate beyond simplistic reputation systems.  
 
In summary, governance theory implies that certain social control principles are interrelated. 
The literature review identified three primary combinations, termed market, hierarchy and 
clan governance. Subsequently, two additional combinations emerged, gifting and reputation 
governance. While this section has delineated the fundamental laws that social control follows 
in OCC, how these laws translate into social control practice requires attention. Furthermore, 
the different ways in which social control can be practiced remains unclear. To address these 
issues, the article now turns to the literature on moderation. 
 
MODERATION IN ONLINE COMMUNITIES OF CONSUMPTION 
 
Social media practitioners have a keen interest in the practice of social control which they 
generally refer to as community management. Given that the term “community management” 
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denotes the implementation of social control for business purposes (Holmström & 
Henfridsson, 2002), and the focus here is on both business and social purposes, the more 
neutral label of moderation is used in this article. Many features of moderation have been 
described in the literature but they are practical accounts about the dos and don’ts of 
moderation in OCCs with no underlying theory (e.g. Fournier & Lee, 2009; McWilliam, 
2000; Williams, 1999; Williams & Cothrel, 2002). Therefore, the purpose of this section is to 
conceptualize moderation in OCCs.  
 Moderation is studied in past research at the level of practices, activities aimed at 
achieving social control. Many moderation practices have been described, from recruiting 
new members to banning them, mentoring and monitoring, editing, archiving and rating posts, 
and many more but no systematic overview exists to date that classifies moderation practices. 
Taking inspiration from governance theory (Heide, 1994) we classify them along two axes: 
governance and moderation purpose. Activities undertaken to achieve social control are 
necessarily different depending on whether control is implemented under the logic of 
exchange, authority or sharing. For example, rules will be formalized in the Terms and 
Conditions or End-User License Agreement (EULA) under the logic of exchange, the 
Community Standards and Privacy Statements under the logic of authority and the User 
Guidelines, Codes of Conduct, Netiquette or FAQ under the logic of sharing (Grimes, Jaeger, 
& Fleischmann, 2008). Governance therefore represents the first dimension on which 
moderation practices should be categorized. 
While governance structures are a useful basis to begin categorizing moderation 
practices, they are insufficient since activities described in the literature could link to all three 
governance structures (e.g., screening profiles, managing conflict or specifying rules). Based 
on Heide (1994), the authors have identified a second dimension on which moderation 
practices should be classified, moderation purpose. In this paper, moderation purpose is a 
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specific goal or function that a moderation practice seeks to achieve. As relationships evolve, 
so does the purpose of moderation, so that moderation purposes are defined based on the 
different moments during interaction (Heide, 1994). Moderation aimed at Interaction 
Initiation seeks to select an individual with whom a satisfactory interaction could develop. 
Moderation aimed at Interaction Maintenance seeks to enhance the parties’ willingness to 
continue interacting. Interaction maintenance describes numerous, heterogeneous moderation 
practices, and can be divided into five sub-purposes: explicating roles, formalizing rules, 
monitoring interactions, rewarding positive behaviors, and sanctioning negative behaviors. 
Moderation aimed at explicating roles provides predefined positions or functions in the 
interaction which involve particular objectives, rights and responsibilities for each party. 
Moderation aimed at formalizing rules specifies rights and responsibilities during interaction 
and future contingencies. Moderation aimed at monitoring interaction records actors’ 
behavior to determine whether there is a social problem. Moderation aimed at rewarding 
positive behavior and sanctioning negative behavior is a set of activities based on the 
monitoring of OCC members’ behaviors to create incentives for positive behaviors and 
disincentives for negative ones. Finally, when the interaction cannot continue, due to natural 
reasons or dysfunction, moderation aimed at Interaction Termination seeks to bring an 
interaction to an end in a way which is acceptable for all parties.   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Moderation practices described in the literature were coded according to (1) governance 
structure (market, hierarchy or clan) and (2) moderation purpose (interaction initiation, 
interaction maintenance with its five sub-purposes, and interaction termination). Note that 
moderation practices associated with hybrid governance structures were not considered as 
they have received little attention and, thus, information was insufficient. For an overview of 
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the literature reviewed see Appendix 2. This review resulted in a classification of 24 types of 
moderation practice, each characterized by the combination of a particular governance 
structure and moderation purpose. Due to space limitations, the different types of moderation 
practices are not described in detail here. Therefore, Table 2 provides an overview of the 
general form of each moderation type and, sometimes, giving examples for clarification. For 
illustration, a selection of moderation practices across all governance structures and 
moderation purposes are sketched within the fictional Clubby community.  
Market interaction initiation consists of selecting a trustworthy exchange partner, a 
member willing to offer or buy a product of interest, who is deemed to be honest and 
dependable. It involves lurking on the website to identify offers or demands, screening 
potential parties’ profiles to determine compatibility and quality, selecting the most 
appropriate party, and contact. In Clubby, a market area enables members to buy and sell 
items related to dance music and clubbing. When a buyer, Andrew, looking for cheap vintage 
LPs, notices that Katie is selling her vintage collection he screens Katie’s profile. As Katie 
seems trustworthy, Andrew tells her that he is interested in the LPs. Katie then screens 
Andrew’s profile and decides to discuss the conditions of the sale with him. Hierarchy 
interaction initiation would involve the same sequence of evaluating, selecting, and deciding 
but it occurs between an applicant wishing to join the community and an administrator, or 
between an administrator and a member wishing to gain responsibilities in the community. In 
clan interaction the same sequence would occur between two equal members of the 
community initiating a communal discussion.  
Hierarchy interaction maintenance involves a wide range of interwoven activities 
between community members and administrators, chiefly, defining the role of administrators 
and the administered (members), formalizing roles and associated behaviors, as well as 
monitoring members’ behaviors, rewarding behaviors benefiting the community and 
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sanctioning detrimental ones. In Clubby, Fiona sends Andrew a welcome message after he 
joins to reward him for joining the community and to incentivize him to further engage. 
Andrew does engage, passionately, and ends up having regular verbal conflicts with other 
members. Andrew’s behavior creates a negative atmosphere and scares off new members, so 
Fiona intervenes. She censors some of Andrew’s comments reminding him that certain 
behaviors are forbidden on the platform per community standards. Over time, Andrew’s 
strong engagement in the community, coupled with his broad knowledge of the clubbing 
culture, earns him the kudos of administrators and he is rewarded by being appointed 
administrator of a subsection of Clubby. Interaction maintenance serves the same purposes in 
the other two governance structures, but they take a different meaning due to the different 
types of interactions. In market governance, buyer and seller roles are specified in the site’s 
Terms and Conditions or EULA. In clan governance, member roles are functional (storyteller, 
historian, ambassador or comedian) and they are defined in User guidelines. Monitoring in 
market and clan governance is often simply based on reading posts. Reward and sanctions are 
informal as members lack special technological power.  
Clan interaction termination aims to bring a relationship with another member to an 
end as smoothly as possible. Typically one ignores other members or, more formally, blocks 
them. In Clubby, Andrew has ignored a few trolls, members who derive pleasure from 
annoying others. But the trolls continue spamming Andrew so that he blacklists them, adding 
them to his “kill file”. In hierarchy governance, interaction termination is generally called 
“banning” and consists of permanently removing a member from the community. Market 
interaction termination is more natural as the interaction is not meant to continue once the 
transaction is completed. At most, parties exchange emails to confirm a deal is concluded. 
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Further Research. Three interesting areas for future research regarding moderation practices 
stand out. The first concerns how monitoring varies depending on technology. Platform 
technology enables and constrains what behaviors can be monitored. For example, social 
networking sites are conducive to tracking member networks of interactions while this is more 
difficult on blogs and forums. In contrast, on these platforms text mining can be more easily 
exploited as a tool for monitoring. Beyond platform technology, the community access device 
(e.g., desktop, mobile phone, tablet) influences monitoring practices. While computers allow 
for in-depth tracking and analysis of Internet surfing and webpage visiting behaviors, mobile 
phones and tablets offer geo-localization functionalities, while the latest smart devices (e.g., 
Google glasses, hot bands) connect directly with consumers’ bodies (augmented reality, 
biometric sensing) enabling monitoring of community engagement in a much deeper way. 
Moreover, while traditional OCCs would be located in a single site, today OCCs are dispersed 
across interlinked locations. For instance, fans of Lady Gaga meet on Facebook, interact on 
(micro-) blogs, trade collectors’ items in a market place, and comment on YouTube videos. 
As the members interact on multiple platforms, more dynamic analyses accounting for 
platform shifts are necessary but this is a challenge as metrics vary across platforms. 
Variations in monitoring activities therefore call for the delineation of the dimensions of 
monitoring (e.g. purpose, metrics, data integration, data analysis, reporting) and how they 
combine depending on the type of platform the community is based on, the kind of device the 
community can be accessed from and whether the community is mono-platform or multi-
platform.  
This is important as monitoring is a necessary basis for the definition and enforcement 
of rewards, sanctions and interaction termination. Variations in monitoring thus have a strong 
influence on the other aspects of moderation. Theorizing the different ways in which 
monitoring is achieved in OCCs is also important groundwork for the improvement of 
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community management software. Finally technology-enhanced monitoring can raise ethical 
issues in relation to privacy. It is therefore important to better understand how monitoring 
functions in OCCs to be able to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
monitoring.  
The second area for future research relates to understanding how moderation practices 
evolve as moderation become ineffective or detrimental to the community if not adapted to 
changing circumstances (e.g., Wiertz et al., 2010). Adapting moderation practices means 
influencing them for the benefit of the group so we call it second-order moderation. The 
classification of moderation practices emerging from the literature review is static, thus 
exploratory research is needed to examine second order moderation. Research could start 
exploring second-order moderation with a typology of its practices. For example, in 
hierarchical interaction termination, administrators can resign (Williams, 1999), or be 
dismissed. Administrators can be dismissed by a more powerful administrator (Williams, 
1999) or by community members. Members can dismiss administrators via a system of meta-
administration (“meta-moderation”) whereby members constantly evaluate administrators’ 
quality and distribute positive and negative “power points” (Lampe & Resnick, 2004), an 
electoral system (cf. Reid, 1999, O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007) or via boycotts and revolutions 
(Grimes et al., 2008). This brief comparison of the different ways of adapting hierarchical 
interaction termination indicates three axes on which dismissal-oriented second-order 
moderation can be organized: voluntary or involuntary, top-down or bottom-up, peaceful or 
belligerent. Based on these distinctions, further research could investigate whether the 
execution of social control in the community improves or deteriorates depending on the type 
of second-order moderation used. Furthermore, future research could identify contingencies 
and determinants of second-order moderation activation: when and why are moderation 
practices adapted? Contingencies could relate to endogenous forces (e.g., technological 
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innovation, membership characteristics, community culture, or community age) or exogenous 
forces (e.g., growing or shrinking interest for the consumption activity, corporate activities, 
current events, or seasonality).   
The third area for future research concerns the conceptualization of moderation at a 
community level. Moderation has generally been described in the literature by inventorying 
singular moderation practices operating at the micro-level of interactions. However, social 
control in OCCs is not implemented on a case by case basis but rather as part of an 
overarching social control system, an integrated set of moderation practices implementing 
social control at a community level. Conceptualizing how moderation practices integrate into 
social control systems is important theoretically as it provides a macro understanding of 
moderation in OCCs. It is also of major interest to community managers and leaders as it 
gives them conceptual tools to develop community-wide social control strategies. We 
therefore introduce the concept of moderation configuration. A configuration is an 
arrangement of causal variables (termed elements or conditions) that generate an outcome of 
interest (cf. El Sawy, Malhotra, Park, & Pavlou, 2010; Meyer, Tsui, & Hining, 1993). Thus a 
moderation configuration is an arrangement of moderation practices that together generate 
social control. A moderation configuration is characterized by (1) the types of moderation 
practices and (2) the central or peripheral role that each of them plays (El Sawy et al., 2014).  
This conceptualization raises two important research questions. First, which 
moderation configurations can be found in OCCs? This call for investigating the determinants 
of moderation configurations with the aim of building a taxonomy of OCC moderation 
configurations. Based on the authors’ knowledge of the literature and their netnographic 
experiences in OCCs, three primary determinants are proposed which could form the 
dimensions of the taxonomy: community orientation, community ownership, and community 
lifecycle. OCCs have different orientations or primary purposes: commerce (e.g., eBay, 
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Amazon), play (e.g., World of Warcraft), support (e.g., self-help groups), networking (e.g., 
LinkedIn groups), and information (e.g., news sites, technical forums, 3P communities) (cf. 
Hagel & Armstrong, 1997; Kozinets, 1999). Community orientation determines which types 
of interactions are common or less common and hence influences which governance 
structures have a central role in the moderation configuration. Regarding ownership structure, 
OCCs can be owned by consumers aiming to derive consumption related interests from the 
community (grassroots OCCs) or by companies aiming to derive profit from it (corporate 
OCCs).  Companies’ business interests may be at odds with members’ communal interests so 
owners of corporate communities tend to nurture behaviors beneficial to the company’s 
interests by implementing strong hierarchical rewards and sanctions and detailed transactional 
rule specifications (e.g. West & O’Mahony, 2008).  With regards to community life cycles, 
the dominant purpose of interactions and the most common social problems evolve 
throughout OCC life from inception to growth, maturity and transformation or mitosis (cf. 
Toder-Alon, Brunel and Schneier Siegal, 2005; Howard,  2010; Millington, 2012). As a result, 
the way social control is (or should be) practiced changes too.  
Once the main moderation configurations operating in OCCs identified researchers 
could investigate the circumstances under which each configuration is effective. For example, 
when does corporate owners’ imposition of hierarchical standards lead to actual social control 
and when does it provoke backlashes from members wary of the instrumentalization of their 
community for business purposes? Taken together, this research program would give 
community managers systematic insight into how to design effective control systems for 
different types of OCC with varying objectives and evolving lifecycles. 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
CONCLUSION 
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OCCs have gained increasing attention from marketing scholars in the last 15 years. However, 
the diversity of members’ interests and goals has only recently been recognized as a major 
social problem threatening OCC’s sustainability. As a result, knowledge on social control is 
fragmented. Taking a governance approach, this paper delineated OCC social control, its main 
constructs and their relationships and identified under-researched areas with regard to the 
topic.  
Two main theoretical contributions emerged from the delineation of OCC social 
control. First, it identified misconceptions regarding the levels at which the different aspects 
of OCC social control operate. Prior research assumed the principles of social control operate 
at a community level. However, careful conceptualization of principles as governance 
structures revealed that they actually operate at an interaction level. This revision is important 
as it means that a given OCC does not follow one principle but rather includes a large number 
of principles. Future explication of social control in OCCs should account for this diversity. In 
contrast with the principles of social control, the practice of social control has been assumed 
to operate at the interaction level. Yet, while moderation practices achieve social control 
during interactions, moderation practices coalesce into moderation configurations which 
operate at the community level. This is important as it implies that individual moderation 
practices cannot be used as the only unit of analysis to evaluate social control effectiveness. 
Moderation configurations must also account for community level moderation.  
 Second, the delineation of social control in OCCs sets the stage for a more systematic 
and theoretical investigation of the topic. Previous work on social control in OCCs has 
accumulated a large volume of concepts. These concepts developed independently from one 
another so that labels have been inconsistently applied with the same labels describing 
different social control elements and vice versa. This definitional issue made it difficult to 
determine which labels refer to the same concepts and which labels do not, generally 
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hindering the identification of what is known or unknown. Delineating social control in OCCs 
has created a framework with a well-defined unified vocabulary. The framework and its 
vocabulary enable to compare and contrast the concepts in the literature. It is therefore a 
useful tool to develop a cumulative body of knowledge on social control in OCCs. The 
authors of this article have used them to develop a research agenda highlighting important 
research questions and serving as a reference point for further research. Researchers interested 
in social control in OCC are invited to use them too to position the phenomenon they are 
interested in within the existing body of knowledge.  
Beyond theoretical contributions, multiple managerial implications follow from the 
paper. The framework for moderation is a useful diagnostic and tactical tool for community 
managers, helping them to choose the right approach to moderation depending on the social 
problem at hand. Does the problem lie in selecting the right parties, maintaining engagement 
between parties, or dismissing the parties? Is the problem embedded in transactional, 
hierarchical, communal, gifting or social hierarchical interactions? Based on these questions, 
different types of moderation practices should be implemented to achieve social control. 
Imagine a community in which recurrent conflicts erupt, jeopardizing community health. If 
conflicts are started by new members/trolls who enjoy fights with administrators, the problem 
lies in hierarchical interaction and relates to the initiation phase of interaction. Administrators 
should create or adapt the selection process for new members. If, by contrast, conflicts erupt 
repeatedly between new and core members because newcomers find core members scornful 
and aggressive, the problem is embedded in communal interactions during interaction 
maintenance. The solution lies in clanic interaction maintenance practices aimed at sustaining 
members’ engagement. This could be achieved, for instance, when community leaders ensure 
that newcomers’ status is visible on their profile and when they nurture formal traditions 
regarding where new members should post or how core members should explain the 
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community’s culture and codes to new members. Table 2 gives an overview of the different 
types of moderation practices community managers can engage in depending on the moment 
of interaction and the type of interaction in which the social problem is embedded. The 
conceptualization of social control systems also provides community managers with a 
strategic tool to achieve social control at a community level. Based on the contingencies 
discussed, community managers can design blue prints of their communities’ social control 
system by defining which types of moderation practices listed in Table 2 must operate in their 
community and whether these practices should have a central or a peripheral role. Community 
managers could then use this blue print as a template to implement social control systems.  
In conclusion, the discussion of social control in OCCs has highlighted that it is a rich, 
varied and multi-level phenomenon. As such, it deserves researchers’ attention, to provide 
systematic insights and further theoretical illumination. Explanation of the processes and 
dynamics of OCC social control will aid community managers to do a better job 
implementing social control. This will benefit the millions of consumers that are engaged in 
OCCs and contribute substantial value for businesses and consumers.   
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Governance 
Structure 
Market Hierarchy Clan 
Logic  Exchange Authority Sharing 
Type of interaction 
Transactional 
interaction 
Hierarchical 
interaction 
Communal 
interaction 
Social control rule Exchange rate 
Authoritarian 
standards 
Traditions 
Rule enforcement  Negotiation Coercion Peer pressure 
Social control 
requirement  
Direct reciprocity Legitimate authority Shared identity 
Table 1: OCC Governance Structures
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  MARKET HIERARCHY CLAN 
INITIATING  
INTERACTION 
Recruiting Evaluating community: lurking 
Evaluating party: compatibility, quality 
Selecting and contacting 
Evaluating  community by individual 
lurking/profile screening 
Selecting and contacting: 
applying/inviting  
Evaluating individual by community: 
application screening /lurking  
Deciding 
Evaluating community: lurking  
Spontaneous exchange 
Profile screening  
Connecting formally 
MAINTENING 
INTERACTION 
Explicating 
roles 
Beneficiary: seeks resource 
Provider: provides resource  
 
Administrator: ensuring rules are 
respected, managing information overload, 
promoting interactions, mediating conflict 
Administered: complying with rules 
Functional social roles: ambassador, 
historian, mentor, learner, hero, storyteller, 
performer, greeter, catalyst, etc. 
 Formalizing 
rules 
EULA and ToS: rights and responsibilities 
of transacting parties and contingency 
planning for inadequate transactions and 
transaction failure 
Community standards and privacy 
statements: members’ fundamental 
freedoms and rights and their boundaries, 
administrators powers and responsibilities, 
conflict resolution procedures  
User guidelines, codes of conduct, 
netiquettes, mission statements and 
FAQ: community-wide traditions, local 
traditions and how local traditions can 
cohabitate 
 Monitoring 
interactions 
Bidding monitoring systems  
 
Reading discussions  
Community management system 
functionalities: behavioral tracking via 
web analytics, semantic analysis, spyware  
Reading discussions  
Profile screening: interest, membership 
length, volume of contribution, number of 
contacts, badges 
 Rewarding 
positive  
behavior 
Informal positive feedback: thanking, 
congratulating  
Good intentions: welcoming, empathizing,  
Good behaviors: awarding points and 
power  
Good intentions: welcoming, empathizing 
Good behaviors: praise 
 
 Sanctioning 
negative 
behavior 
Informal negative feedback: voicing in 
private message 
Censoring discussions: editing, moving, 
closing and archiving comments, 
discussions and discussion areas 
Punishing members: paralyzing, exiling 
Managing conflicts: mediating, arbitrating 
Informing: reminding norm 
Insulting: associating other with 
stigmatized group, picking on grammar - 
very blunt or sarcastic 
TERMINATING 
INTERACTION 
Dismissing Confirmation email Banning member or replace 
administrator  
Ignore 
Block: Unfollow, unfriend, add to “kill 
file” 
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Governance Structures - the Principles of Social Control   
Governance-
substructures 
How are alternative forms of transaction governed? For example, how is 
trade governed that serves expressive purposes such as not-for-profit or 
barter trade?  What are the rules guiding trade based on alternative 
currencies such as crypto-currencies or point-based currencies?  
Under what circumstances does or should hierarchy governance adopt 
meritocratic or despotic principles? In particular, in company-owned OCCs 
where administrators govern as firm employees, when and how do 
administrators reward (punish) members for their talent or for the value they 
bring to (take away from) the firm?  
What are the specifics of global and local clan governance operations? For 
example, which traditions operate when a conflict situation is encapsulated 
by a local or a global communal identity? Are the members applying peer 
pressure similarly under each identity? Do members apply peer pressure 
using different strategies? 
Hybrid 
Governance 
Structures 
How is counter-gift reciprocation ensured in gift governance? In which 
circumstances should OCCs detail the conditions of counter-gifting to 
enforce reciprocation? When conditions of counter-gifting are detailed, what 
would be the effect of recommending an acceptable time-frame for counter-
gifting, or of detailing the nature of the reciprocal gift? Can self-enforced 
reciprocation be nurtured and, if so, how? What other ways may there be to 
enforce reciprocation?  
How can competitive uses of reputation systems (where members cheat the 
system to boost their reputation and defame that of others) be discouraged or 
reduced? In particular, how do members evaluate others’ contribution 
beyond number of posts and ratings? Which deference and demeanor rituals 
do members engage in to define their social status and exert social power?  
Moderation - the Practice of Social Control  
Technology 
and 
Moderation 
Practices 
How does OCC platform technology influence the different dimensions of 
monitoring? For example, how do platform type, the mono- or multi-
platform nature of the OCC and the access device influence monitoring 
purpose, metrics, data integration, data analysis, and reporting?  
Second Order 
Moderation 
Can different axes of moderation adaptation be distinguished? For example, 
hierarchical interactions can be terminated voluntarily or involuntarily, 
peacefully or belligerently and with a top-down or a bottom-up approach. 
Do those axes apply to the adaptation of other moderation practices, and can 
more axes be identified? 
What circumstances require moderation practices to adapt? What are the 
drivers of moderation adaptation?  
Moderation 
Configurations 
Whether and how moderation configurations differ in OCCs oriented toward 
commerce, play, support, information and/or networking. 
Whether and how moderation configurations differ in OCCs owned by 
commercial brands, third parties and/or consumers. 
Whether and how moderation configurations vary across OCC lifecycles 
from inception, to growth, maturity, and transformation. 
 Which moderation configurations are most effective at achieving social 
control, and under which circumstances?  
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Authors, Year  Research 
Domain 
Type of 
online 
community 
Market 
Governance 
Hierarchy 
Governance 
Clan 
Governance 
De Zwart & 
Lindsay, 2009 
Internet 
Studies 
Virtual 
worlds 
   
Di Tullio & 
Staples, 2013 
Information 
systems 
Open source 
communities 
   
Duval Smith, 
1999 
Sociology Multi-user 
dungeons 
   
Fairfield, 2008 Law Virtual 
worlds 
   
Forte, Larco, & 
Bruckman, 2009 
Information 
systems 
Wikipedia 
   
Gilkeson & 
Reynolds, 2003 
Marketing Communities 
of transaction 
   
Humphreys, 
2008 
Cultural 
Studies 
Virtual 
worlds 
   
Kollock & 
Smith, 1996 
Sociology Bulletin board 
(Usenet) 
   
McWilliam, 
2000 
Marketing Brand 
communities 
   
O’Mahony & 
Ferraro, 2007 
Management Open source 
communities 
   
Ren, Kraut, & 
Kiesler, 2007 
Management Online 
communities 
in general 
   
Reid, 1999 Sociology Multi-user 
dungeons 
   
Shah, 2006 Management Open source 
communities 
   
Wiertz, 
Mathwick, De 
Ruyter, & 
Dellaert, 2010 
Marketing Peer-to-peer 
problem 
solving    
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Authors, Year Relationship 
Initiation 
Relationship Maintenance Relationship 
Termination Roles Formal 
Rules  
Monitoring 
 
Rewards Punishment 
Campbell, Fletcher, & Greenhill, 2009        
Chalmers Thomas, Price, & Schau, 2013        
Chu & Liao, 2007        
Citera, Beauregard, & Mitsuya, 2005        
Colayco & Davies, 2003        
Dellarocas, 2010        
De Zwart & Lindsay, 2009        
Duval Smith, 1999        
Fairfield, 2008        
Forte, Larco, & Bruckman, 2009        
Fournier & Lee, 2009        
Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003        
Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischmann , 2008        
Homström & Henfridson, 2002        
Humphreys, 2008        
Kollock & Smith, 1996        
Lampe & Resnick, 2004        
Lampe & Johnston, 2005        
McWilliam, 2000        
Moon & Sproull, 2008        
Muniz & Schau, 2005        
O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007        
Preece, Nonnecke & Andrews, 2004        
Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007        
Reid, 1999        
Schau, Muniz, & Arnould, 2009        
Shah, 2006        
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Wiertz, Mathwick, De Ruyter, & Dellaert, 
2010 
       
Williams & Cothrel, 2000        
Williams,  1999        
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